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272 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 82
INTRODUCTION
Imagine finally achieving your goal of becoming an elementary school
teacher at a Catholic school. After earning a bachelor’s degree in liberal
arts, pursuing more schooling to receive a teaching credential, and
eventually working your way up the chain of command from tutor to long-
term substitute teacher, you become a full-time teacher.1 You receive
praiseworthy commentary from your supervisory principal, noting your
excellent promotion of a safe and caring space in which students can learn,
your keen ability to cater to the different needs of different students, and
your empathic methods of instilling and encouraging growth in students.2 
The lone negative comment expresses that a couple of students were off-
task during the principal’s classroom observation.3 Six months later, you
are diagnosed with breast cancer and must undergo grueling chemotherapy
and progressive cancer treatment.4 You break the news to your husband
and young children, and then you must inform your boss that you will need
time off to undergo treatment. 
Within weeks of telling the administration of your diagnosis, the
school terminates your contract, citing, in particular, “it was not fair . . . to
have two teachers for the children during the school year.”5 Confused,
scared, and angry, you file an employment discrimination suit, alleging
disability discrimination under the Americans with Disabilities Act.6 
Before the suit reaches the trial stage, however, the school moves for
summary judgment, citing the ministerial exception.7 The court grants the
motion, completely precluding a trial on the merits.8 With no right to bring
the action in court, you are now powerless to challenge the grounds of your
termination. This is the story of Kristin Biel, the plaintiff in Biel v. St.
Copyright 2021, by MADELEINE BREAUX.
* J.D. candidate 2022, Paul M. Hebert Law Center, Louisiana State University.
1. Biel v. St. James Sch., 911 F.3d 603, 605 (9th Cir. 2018).
2. Id. at 606.
3. Id.
4. Id. at 605.
5. Id.
6. Id. at 606; see 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a). 
7. Biel, 911 F.3d at 606. The ministerial exception is a judicially created
operation of law that bars employees of religious organizations from bringing
employment discrimination suits to court. See McClure v. Salvation Army, 460
F.2d 553, 555 (5th Cir. 1972).
8. Biel, 911 F.3d at 606.
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2732021] COMMENT
James School.9 Though she passed away a year before the Supreme Court
granted certiorari on her case, her suit provides a modern-day example of
the form and function of the ministerial exception.10 
The ministerial exception is a judicially created legal doctrine that
religious organizations can invoke to escape liability in employment
discrimination cases filed by their ministers.11 First created by the courts 
in 1972, the exception bars employees who are ministers of religious
organizations from bringing employment discrimination suits against their
employers.12 Thus, the application of the ministerial exception to a specific
case depends on whether the claimant is a minister of the religious
organization.13 Since the inception of the exception, courts have grappled 
with tailoring the scope of who qualifies as a minister.14 Now, after the
Supreme Court’s recent 7–2 decision in Our Lady of Guadalupe School v.
Morrissey-Berru, the ministerial exception essentially serves as a carte
blanche, as the Court expanded the scope of “minister” to include any
employee whose job serves a religious function within the institution.15 
This expansion allows religious employers to escape liability in
employment discrimination suits filed by their teachers and any other
employee whose role serves a religious function—impacting nearly every
9. Id. at 605. Biel’s case was joined with Agnes Morrissey-Berru’s
employment discrimination case that was also out of the Ninth Circuit. Id. 
10. Adam Liptak, Job Bias Laws Do Not Protect Teachers in Catholic 
Schools, Supreme Court Rules, THE N.Y. TIMES (July 8, 2010), https://www.
nytimes.com/2020/07/08/us/job-bias-catholic-schools-supreme-court.html?searc
hResultPosition=2 [https://perma.cc/7BH7-D96K]. Biel’s husband acted as
substituted plaintiff after her passing. Biel, 911 F.3d 603.
11. Petruska v. Gannon Univ., 462 F.3d 294, 299 (3d Cir. 2006). 
12. McClure, 460 F.2d at 560. The Fifth Circuit was the first court to hold
that a ministerial exception existed and, in effect, barred ministers of religious
organizations from bringing employment discrimination suits against their
religious employers. Id.
13. See Conlon v. InterVarsity Christian Fellowship, 777 F.3d 829 (6th Cir.
2015); Cannata v. Cath. Diocese of Austin, 700 F.3d 169 (5th Cir. 2012); E.E.O.C.
v. Roman Cath. Diocese of Raleigh, N.C., 213 F.3d 795 (4th Cir. 2000); Hollins
v. Methodist Healthcare, Inc., 474 F.3d 223 (6th Cir. 2007); Shaliehsabou v.
Hebrew Home of Greater Wash., Inc., 363 F.3d 299 (4th Cir. 2004).
14. See cases cited supra note 13.
15. See Our Lady of Guadalupe Sch. v. Morrissey-Berru, 140 S. Ct. 2049,
2072 (2020) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting. “Carte blanche” means “full discretionary
power; unlimited authority.” Carte Blanche, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed.
2019).
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274 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 82
American who is employed by a religious institution, organization, or
school.16 
As demonstrated by Kristin Biel’s story, the ministerial exception’s
effects are potent. When applied, the ministerial exception completely bars
plaintiffs from litigating their claims and prevents any inquiry into the
allegedly discriminatory reasons behind religious organizations’
employment decisions.17 Courts frequently cite the First Amendment’s
Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses as the constitutional bases for
the ministerial exception.18 The Free Exercise Clause “protects the
[religious employer’s] act of a decision rather than a motivation behind
it,”19 and the Establishment Clause limits the degree that the government
can interfere in church matters.20 
Within the past decade, the Supreme Court granted certiorari on two 
ministerial exception cases.21 In its holdings in Hosanna-Tabor
Evangelical School v. E.E.O.C. and Our Lady of Guadalupe School v.
Morrissey-Berru, the Court expanded the powers bestowed to religious
institutions through the ministerial exception, resulting in an
unprecedented potency within the employment field.22 This expansion
contravenes the broad protections for workers and narrow protective
exceptions for religious institutions that Congress guaranteed in Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII). Title VII generally protects
workers from employment discrimination based on “race, color, religion,
sex, or national origin.”23 However, Title VII contains a creed exception 
that allows religious employers to discriminate based on religion in order
to employ individuals who are also of that faith.24 Additionally, Title VII
carves out a curriculum exception for religious educational institutions.25 
16. See Our Lady of Guadalupe Sch., 140 S. Ct. at 2072.
17. Roman Cath. Diocese, 213 F.3d at 801 (quoting Rayburn v. General Conf.
of Seventh-Day Adventists, 772 F.2d 1164, 1169 (4th Cir. 1985)).
18. See McClure v. Salvation Army, 460 F.2d 553 (5th Cir. 1972); Roman 
Cath. Diocese, 213 F.3d at 795; Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church &
Sch. v. E.E.O.C., 565 U.S. 171 (2012).
19. See Roman Cath. Diocese, 213 F.3d at 801 (quoting Rayburn, 772 F.2d
at 1169).
20. See U.S. CONST. amend. I; see also Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602
(1971).
21. See Hosanna-Tabor, 565 U.S. at 181; see also Our Lady of Guadalupe
Sch., 140 S. Ct. 2049 (majority opinion).
22. See Hosanna-Tabor, 565 U.S. at 181; see also Our Lady of Guadalupe
Sch., 140 S. Ct. at 2072 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
23. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1).
24. Id. § 2000e-1(a).
25. See id. § 2000e-2(e)(2). The curriculum exception explicitly states:
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2752021] COMMENT
Because of the Court’s recognition of a very broad ministerial exception
to the employment discrimination law’s protections and exceptions
carefully laid out by Congress, the Supreme Court in Our Lady of
Guadalupe School committed judicial overreach.26 
With the Court’s broadened definition of “minister” in Our Lady of
Guadalupe School, the ministerial exception will undoubtedly serve as an
impermeable barrier between litigants seeking justice for discrimination
claims and their chance for remedy.27 The decision essentially strips over
100,000 secular teachers at religious private schools of their right to be
free from employment discrimination, and in the case that discrimination
does occur, they also lose the right to a remedy.28 Additionally, the Court’s
focus on the function of the employee in determining who is a minister for
the purposes of the ministerial exception exposes even more employees of
religious organizations to unchecked discrimination.29 The decision
contravenes the protections for workers and exceptions for religious
employers that Congress laid out in Title VII. To resolve this issue, the
Supreme Court needs to revisit the issue of who is considered a minister
by granting certiorari in a ministerial exception case and ruling to retract
its sweeping definition of “minister.” 
Part I of this Comment will provide a brief background of Title VII
and the ministerial exception from its inception to the present. Part II will
analyze the majority, concurring, and dissenting opinions in Our Lady of
Guadalupe School v. Morrissey-Berru and will show how many lives are
(2) it shall not be an unlawful employment practice for a school,
college, university, or other educational institution or institution
of learning to hire and employ employees of a particular
religion if such school, college, university, or other educational 
institution or institution of learning is, in whole or in substantial
part, owned, supported, controlled, or managed by a particular
religion or by a particular religious corporation, association, or
society, or if the curriculum of such school, college, university,
or other educational institution or institution of learning is
directed toward the propagation of a particular religion.
Id.
26. See Our Lady of Guadalupe Sch., 140 S. Ct. at 2072 (Sotomayor, J.,
dissenting).
27. Id.
28. Liptak, supra note 10.
29. Our Lady of Guadalupe Sch., 140 S. Ct. at 2081. For example, Justice
Sotomayor notes, “the rights of countless coaches, camp counselors, nurses,
social-service workers, in-house lawyers, media-relations personnel, and many
others who work for religious institutions” are now subject to discrimination
based on any animus on the part of the employer. Id.
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276 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 82
affected by the Supreme Court’s newly espoused definition of “minister.”
This Part will explain that the Supreme Court has effectively confiscated
rights to trial and remedy from an entire demographic once protected by
Title VII and other federal employment discrimination laws, changing the
landscape of employment discrimination law and promulgating a culture
of permissible and unchecked bias in the workplace culture of religious
institutions. Part III will examine, in the context of the ministerial
exception, the competing interests of the United States’ system of
separation of church and state laid out in the First Amendment and Title
VII. This Part will illustrate American society’s desire for the branches of
government to protect its citizens from discrimination and will examine 
the current state of judicial and legislative power within the American
system of checks and balances regarding Constitutional interpretation and
enforcement. Part IV will assert that the Supreme Court committed judicial
overreach in its expansion of the ministerial exception and will propose
that if the Court grants certiorari on another ministerial exception case, the
Court should adopt a refined Hosanna-Tabor factor analysis.30 
I. TRACING THE MINISTERIAL EXCEPTION
The United States Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals first created the
ministerial exception in 1972.31 Following the Fifth Circuit’s precedent,
every circuit court adopted the exception, with varying tests for
determining who constitutes a minister, into its own jurisprudence.32 This
30. See generally Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v.
E.E.O.C., 565 U.S. 171 (2012). A rather significant obstacle stands in the way of
this proposed solution. Due to the current composition of the Supreme Court, it is
unlikely that the Court will grant certiorari on another ministerial exception case 
or narrow an exception that favors religious freedom over anti-discrimination
rights any time in the near future.
31. McClure v. Salvation Army, 460 F.2d 553 (5th Cir. 1972).
32. See Natal v. Christian and Missionary All., 878 F.2d 1575, 1578 (1st Cir. 
1989); Rweyemamu v. Cote, 520 F.3d 198, 204–09 (2d Cir. 2008); Petruska v.
Gannon Univ., 462 F.3d 294, 303–07 (3d Cir. 2006); E.E.O.C. v. Roman Cath.
Diocese of Raleigh, N.C., 213 F.3d 795, 800–01 (4th Cir. 2000); Combs v. Cent. 
Tex. Ann. Conf., 173 F.3d 343, 345–50 (5th Cir. 1999); Hollins v. Methodist
Healthcare, Inc., 474 F.3d 223, 225–27 (6th Cir. 2007); Schleicher v. Salvation
Army, 518 F.3d 472, 475 (7th Cir. 2008); Scharon v. St. Luke’s Episcopal
Presbyterian Hosps., 929 F.2d 360, 362–63 (8th Cir. 1991); Werft v. Desert Sw.
Ann. Conf., 377 F.3d 1099, 1100–04 (9th Cir. 2004); Bryce v. Episcopal Church
in the Diocese of Colo., 289 F.3d 648, 655–57 (10th Cir. 2002); Gellington v.
Christian Methodist Episcopal Church, Inc., 203 F.3d 1299, 1301–04 (11th Cir. 
2000); E.E.O.C. v. Cath. Univ., 83 F.3d 455, 460–63 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
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2772021] COMMENT
lack of a streamlined definition for “minister” led the Supreme Court to
grant certiorari on a ministerial exception case in 2012, forty years after
the exception’s initial creation.33 
A. The Inception of the Exception
Though its roots lie in the First Amendment, the ministerial exception
is a judicially created doctrine of law, first recognized by the Fifth Circuit
in the case of McClure v. Salvation Army.34 The plaintiff in McClure, 
Billie McClure, completed a two-year training period to become a minister
in the Salvation Army.35 The Salvation Army proclaims to be “an 
evangelical part of the universal Christian Church.”36 When the Salvation
Army fired her, McClure brought an employment discrimination suit and
alleged Title VII violations, particularly that she was fired due to her
complaints filed with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission.37 
Additionally, she alleged that she received lesser compensation and
benefits than similarly situated male ministers.38 In response, the Salvation
Army filed a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction, claiming that
because it qualifies as a religious organization under § 702 of Title VII,
any claims of employment discrimination in the relationship between a
church and its ministers are exempt from the discrimination laws.39 
At the time, § 702 stated, “This subchapter shall not apply . . . to a 
religious corporation, association, education institution, or society with
respect to the employment of individuals of a particular religion to perform
work connected with the carrying on by such corporation, association,
educational institution, or society of its activities.”40 The Salvation Army
argued that applying Title VII standards for employment discrimination
cases between a religious institution and its officers would constitute an
33. Hosanna-Tabor, 565 U.S. at 196.
34. McClure, 460 F.2d at 560.
35. Id. at 555.
36. Our Mission Statement, THE SALVATION ARMY, https://www.salvation
armyusa.org/usn/about/ [https://perma.cc/JQ8T-J6N6] (last visited Oct. 6, 2020).
Further, the Salvation Army’s “message is based on the Bible. Its ministry is
motivated by the love of God. Its mission is to preach the gospel of Jesus Christ 
and to meet human needs in His name without discrimination.” Id. (emphasis
added).
37. About the E.E.O.C., U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, https://
www.eeoc.gov/youth/about-eeoc-2 [https://perma.cc/MX8M-KV95] (last visited
Oct. 6, 2020).
38. McClure, 460 F.2d at 555.
39. Id. at 553, 555; 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-1(a) (2018).
40. Section 702 of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-1(a) (now Section 703).
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278 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 82
intrusion into the First Amendment’s Free Exercise and Establishment
Clauses.41 In response, McClure argued that the legislative history and
statutory language demonstrate that Congress intended a narrow
interpretation of the exception granted to religious organizations in §
702.42 Therefore, Congress intended § 702 to merely allow religious
institutions to select employees of a certain faith to carry out the private
institution’s work, not discriminate against hired employees or fire them
for any discriminatory reason.43 
To make its decision, the Fifth Circuit considered the metaphorical
wall between church and state created by Supreme Court jurisprudence
and the Constitution.44 The McClure court ultimately determined that,
though it may be difficult to decide which issues can breach the wall of
separation, the general rule is that this wall should remain “high and
impregnable.”45 The court emphasized that the burden to prove a necessity
to encroach, even in the slightest, upon the rights guaranteed in the Free
Exercise Clause and breach the “impregnable” wall is extraordinarily
high.46 In order to infringe upon the First Amendment, a “compelling state
interest in the regulation of a subject within the State’s constitutional
power to regulate” must be shown, and “[o]nly the gravest abuses,
endangering paramount interests, give occasion for permissible 
limitation.”47 
The Fifth Circuit held that Congress did not intend for Title VII to 
regulate or interfere in any way with the employment relationship between
a church and its ministers, who serve as its lifeblood.48 Thus, the Fifth
Circuit was the first to adjudge explicitly that the government should not
be allowed to interfere in the employment decisions a religious employer
makes regarding its “ministers.”49 The Fourth Circuit court in Rayburn v. 
General Conference of Seventh Day Adventists later formally named this
exception “the ministerial exception.”50 Throughout the years, each of the
federal circuit courts recognized the legal validity of the ministerial
41. McClure, 460 F.2d at 556.





47. Id. (quoting Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 406 (1963)).
48. Id. at 560.
49. Id. 
50. Rayburn v. Gen. Conf. of Seventh-Day Adventists, 772 F.2d 1164, 1168
(4th Cir. 1985).
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2792021] COMMENT
exception,51 and the Supreme Court ultimately recognized the exception
in 2012.52 
B. The Ministerial Exception Merits Supreme Recognition
The Supreme Court first recognized the ministerial exception in
Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical School v. E.E.O.C.53 In Hosanna-Tabor, the 
Court examined whether the Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses of 
the First Amendment bar employment discrimination suits when the
plaintiff is a titled minister of a religious organization.54 Hosanna-Tabor, 
a Lutheran school, classified its teachers as either “lay”55 or “called.”56 To 
become a “called teacher,” the teacher must meet specific academic-
training criteria outlined by the school.57 If the criteria are met, a
congregation “calls” the teacher, who then receives the formal title of
“Minister of Religion, Commissioned.”58 
Cheryl Perich, the plaintiff, taught at Hosanna-Tabor in various
capacities during her tenure.59 Hosanna-Tabor initially hired Perich as a
lay teacher, but after she successfully performed the requisite academic
training, Hosanna-Tabor bestowed upon Perich the esteemed title of
“Minister of Religion, Commissioned.”60 Among her duties as a “called
teacher,” Perich taught courses in secular subjects, including math,
language arts, social studies, science, gym, art, and music.61 She also 
taught one course in religion four times weekly, brought her students to a
chapel service each week, and led prayers and devotion with her students
daily.62 
In 2004, Perich was diagnosed with narcolepsy and therefore took a
leave of absence for disability at the beginning of that school year.63 When
she asked the school administration to return to her job with a doctor’s
51. See cases cited supra note 32.
52. Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. E.E.O.C., 565
U.S. 171 (2012).
53. Id.
54. Id. at 176.
55. “Lay” means someone not holding a place in the clergy or not holding an
ecclesiastical position. See Lay, MERRIAM-WEBSTER (2020).
56. Hosanna-Tabor, 565 U.S. at 176.
57. Id.
58. Id.





360570-LSU_82-1_Text.indd  284 11/19/21  12:02 PM





    
  
   




    
     
 




     
   
 
    





     
  
   
     
  
     
 
   
    
   
   
     
       
    
  
   
   
    
280 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 82
note clearing her for work, the principal informed Perich that she had been
replaced and offered her “peaceful release.”64 Though Perich showed up 
to work on the first day she was medically cleared to do so, the
congregation fired her, essentially for not quietly resigning.65 After Perich
filed a charge with the EEOC, the EEOC brought a discrimination claim
against Hosanna-Tabor.66 Hosanna-Tabor moved for summary judgment,
claiming that the ministerial exception applied in this suit due to the
employment relationship between a religious institution and its minister.67 
The district court ruled in Hosanna-Tabor’s favor, but the Sixth Circuit
reversed, stating that the duties of a “called teacher” were essentially the
same as a lay teacher, thereby disqualifying Perich from being considered
a minister under the ministerial exception.68 Hosanna-Tabor appealed, and
the Supreme Court granted certiorari.69 
The Court first analyzed the history that served as the backdrop for the
creation of the First Amendment to emphasize the importance and
sacredness of religious freedom.70 The Court then applied the religion
clauses of the First Amendment to the issue, espousing that “[t]he
Establishment Clause prevents the Government from appointing ministers,
and the Free Exercise Clause prevents it from interfering with the freedom
of religious groups to select their own.”71 The Court found that because
employment decisions within a religious organization serve an essential
role in the promulgation of faith, the judicially-created ministerial
exception was a constitutionally valid doctrine.72 
64. Id. “The congregation voted to offer Perich a ‘peaceful release’ from her
call, whereby the congregation would pay a portion of her health insurance
premiums in exchange for her resignation as a called teacher.” Id. at 178.
65. Id. at 179. Perich would not leave the premises without garnering written
documentation that she had shown up for work. Afterwards, the principal called
her and warned her of the likely imminent termination. In response, Perich
mentioned she intended to sue. The school board chairman called Perich’s actions




69. See id. at 181.
70. Id. at 182; see Geary v. Visitation of Blessed Virgin Mary Parish Sch., 7
F.3d 324 (3d Cir. 1993); Dole v. Shenandoah Baptist Church, 899 F.2d 1389 (4th
Cir. 1990); E.E.O.C. v. Miss. Coll., 626 F.2d 477, 479, 485 (5th Cir. 1980);
E.E.O.C. v. Fremont Christian Sch., 781 F.2d 1362, 1369–70 (9th Cir. 1986).
71. Hosanna-Tabor, 565 U.S. at 183.
72. Id. at 190.
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2812021] COMMENT
Further, the Court refused to formulate a rigid test to determine
whether the ministerial exception applied in the Hosanna-Tabor case.73 
Instead, it utilized a totality-of-the-circumstances approach to resolve
whether Perich’s role was that of a minister.74 The Court analyzed four
factors—“the formal title given Perich by the Church, the substance
reflected in that title, her own use of that title, and the important religious
functions she performed for the Church”—and determined Perich was a
minister under the ministerial exception.75 The Court assigned error to the
Sixth Circuit in three areas: the Court of Appeals (1) failed to acknowledge 
the import of Perich’s formal title, (2) gave too much emphasis to the fact
that lay and called teachers performed essentially the same duties, and (3)
gave too much consideration to Perich’s secular duties.76 The Court also
noted that the ministerial exception does not only serve to bar employment
discrimination cases when the plaintiff is fired for a religious reason; the
exception also “ensures that the authority to select and control who will
minister to the faithful—a matter ‘strictly ecclesiastical,’ . . . is the
church’s alone.”77 The Court conceded that its decision was largely made
in deference to the First Amendment, and that to maintain autonomy, the
church must govern its own internal matters.78 
After the Hosanna-Tabor decision, legal scholars pondered how the
ministerial exception would evolve and whether the Court would
eventually provide a rigid test to determine who constituted a minister.79 
Nearly a decade later, the Supreme Court revisited the ministerial
exception in Our Lady of Guadalupe School v. Morrissey-Berru.80 
II. MORE POTENCY, MORE PROBLEMS: THE MINISTERIAL EXCEPTION 
AFTER OUR LADY OF GUADALUPE SCHOOL V. MORRISSEY-BERRU
In July of 2020, the Supreme Court modified the ministerial exception
in Our Lady of Guadalupe School v. Morrissey-Berru.81 In its 7–2 
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 191.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 194–195 (citing Kedroff v. St. Nicholas Cathedral, 344 U.S. 94, 119
(1952)).
78. Id. at 196.
79. See, e.g., Paul Horwitz, Act III of the Ministerial Exception, 106 NW. U.
L. REV. 973, 974 (2012).
80. See Our Lady of Guadalupe Sch. v. Morrissey-Berru, 140 S. Ct. 2049
(2020).
81. See id.
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282 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 82
decision, the Court expanded its interpretation of who is considered a
minister for the purposes of the ministerial exception to include any
employee who serves any religious purpose.82 Under the new definition of
“minister,” hundreds of thousands of secular teachers at private religious
schools lose the protections guaranteed to them by federal employment
discrimination laws.83 The ministerial exception produces extraordinary
effects through the power it grants to religious employers—the ability to
discriminate based on any animus without any repercussion or check.84 
A. The Divine Mystery of Minister Debunked: Our Lady of Guadalupe 
School v. Morrissey-Berru
The Supreme Court granted certiorari and consolidated two Ninth
Circuit cases in Our Lady of Guadalupe School v. Morrissey-Berru.85 One 
of the plaintiffs, Agnes Morrissey-Berru, taught fifth and sixth graders all
subjects, including religion, at Our Lady of Guadalupe School (OLG), a
Catholic school in the diocese of Los Angeles.86 Morrissey-Berru obtained
a bachelor’s degree in English and earned a California teaching credential, 
and during her employment at OLG, she attended mandatory prayer
services and continuing religious-education classes.87 OLG’s mission was 
rooted in the Catholic faith, and per the handbook, the school required
teachers to exemplify the faith and values of Catholicism to students.88 
OLG’s religious mission played an integral role in the school’s hiring and
firing decisions, all of which a parochial priest oversaw.89 Morrissey-
Berru’s duties included bringing her students to confession, participating
in weekly masses, teaching religion out of a textbook, and beginning and
ending the school day in prayer.90 The school prioritized ensuring that
teachers incorporated Catholic values in all of their classroom activities
and subjects, and therefore, performance reviews by OLG faculty focused
on this criterion.91 
82. See id. at 2069.
83. See id. at 2072 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
84. E.E.O.C. v. Roman Cath. Diocese of Raleigh, N.C., 213 F.3d 795, 802
(4th Cir. 2000) (quoting Rayburn v. Gen. Conf. of Seventh-Day Adventists, 772
F.2d 1164, 1169 (4th Cir. 1985)).
85. Our Lady of Guadalupe Sch., 140 S. Ct. at 2060 (majority opinion).
86. Id. at 2056.
87. Id.
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2832021] COMMENT
In 2014, OLG demoted Morrissey-Berru from full-time instructor to 
part-time, and then in 2015, OLG declined to renew her annual contract.92 
Subsequently, Morrissey-Berru filed an age-discrimination claim against
the school with the EEOC, alleging that the school fired her in order to
hire a younger teacher in her place.93 Though the school cited a secular
reason for Morrissey-Berru’s termination—inadequate classroom
performance—OLG also raised the ministerial exception in its attempt to
dismiss the proceeding.94 In using the Hosanna-Tabor totality-of-the-
circumstances test, the Ninth Circuit found that Morrissey-Berru’s lack of
formal ministerial title, lack of extensive religious education, and lack of
a public portrayal as a minister weighed more heavily than her religious
duties as a teacher.95 Therefore, she did not qualify as a minister under the
ministerial exception.96 OLG appealed the Ninth Circuit’s decision, and
the Supreme Court granted certiorari.97 
The other plaintiff in Our Lady of Guadalupe School was Kristin
Biel.98 Biel started employment at St. James Catholic School (St. James)
as a long-term substitute first-grade teacher; subsequently, St. James hired
her as a full-time lay fifth-grade teacher.99 Biel received her bachelor’s
degree in liberal studies, earned a teaching credential, and partook in a
religious conference during her employment at St. James.100 While at St.
James, Biel taught all subjects to her students, including religion.101 Her 
other duties included attending mass and praying daily with her students, 
preparing students for the sacraments and mass, and teaching religion out
of a textbook selected by the principal.102 St. James’s handbook for
teachers resembled OLG’s, requiring that teachers embody Catholic faith
and principles, incorporate Catholicism into all subject matters, and guide
students in their own spiritual growth, particularly by preparing them for
the sacraments.103 Moreover, St. James used the same standards and
92. Id. at 2057–58.
93. Id. at 2058. Morrissey-Berru filed specifically under the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-202, 81 Stat. 602










103. Id. at 2059.
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284 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 82
criteria as OLG in its teacher observation reports, which were performed
by the principal.104 
After her first year of teaching fifth grade full-time, St. James declined
to renew Biel’s contract.105 Biel alleged that St. James fired her because a
few months prior to her termination she disclosed to the principal her
breast cancer diagnosis, which would require her to take time off for
treatment.106 She filed a charge with the EEOC and then brought suit
against St. James, alleging discrimination based on disability.107 St. James
alleged that Biel’s termination was due to poor performance and the
burden her absence would place on her students.108 Soon after Biel filed
suit, St. James invoked the ministerial exception.109 The district court
granted summary judgment in favor of St. James based on the ministerial
exception.110 However, on appeal the Ninth Circuit reversed, citing the
totality-of-the-circumstances analysis used by the Supreme Court in
Hosanna-Tabor.111 The Ninth Circuit found that “Biel lacked Perich’s [the 
claimant in Hosanna-Tabor] ‘credentials, training, [and] ministerial
background,’” and therefore, she did not qualify as a minister for purposes 
of the ministerial exception.112 St. James appealed the decision of the Ninth
Circuit, and the Supreme Court granted certiorari.113 
1. Majority: 2020 Model of Minister
The Supreme Court’s majority opinion, authored by Justice Alito,
begins by explaining that the First Amendment’s Free Exercise and
Establishment Clauses grant the power to decide matters “of faith and
doctrine” solely to religious organizations.114 Further, the Court explained 
that this Constitutional authority grants religious institutions true
autonomy to make their own decisions about internal governance without









112. Id. (citing Biel v. St. James Sch., 911 F.3d 603, 608 (9th Cir. 2018)).
113. Biel, 911 F.3d 603; Morrissey-Berru v. Our Lady of Guadalupe Sch., 769
Fed. App’x. 460 (9th Cir. 2019).
114. Our Lady of Guadalupe Sch., 140 S. Ct. at 2060 (2020) (quoting
Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch., 565 U.S. 171, 186 (2012)).
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2852021] COMMENT
by the government.115 After re-affirming its recognition of the ministerial
exception as an exemption that bars litigants, if considered ministers, from
adjudicating their employment discrimination claims against their
religious employers in a court, the Supreme Court turned to the issue of
who is considered a minister under the ministerial exception.116 
In the beginning of its analysis, the majority explored the Court’s prior
decision in Hosanna-Tabor, including the four factors the Court weighed
in deciding it.117 First, the Court analyzed the first two factors—the formal
title of minister and substance of that title—and explained that these
factors are not universally applicable.118 Various faiths use different
terminology to distinguish those in its hierarchy, and the use of this factor
would allow secular courts to decide which titles of the faith are more 
important than others—a role that should be reserved for the religious
organization.119 Further, any inquiry into the religious significance and 
substance behind the title would constitute an intrusion into church
autonomy.120 
Next, the Court noted the consideration used in Hosanna-Tabor of the
educational experience and background of the employee.121 The Court
contemplated that this factor could create misleading results, as the
religious credentials differ between an elementary school teacher and a
professor, yet their function in furthering the church’s mission may very
well be the same.122 Therefore, under the majority’s reasoning these
factors are not determinative of whether the ministerial exception is
applicable.123 Essentially, the Court reiterated its reasoning that the 
Hosanna-Tabor factors merely constituted a flexible, totality-of-the-
circumstances analysis rather than a rigid test.124 The Court emphasized 
that it created the Hosanna-Tabor factors for the purpose of analyzing the
relevant circumstances related to that particular plaintiff, Cheryl Perich, in
that particular case.125 
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 2063.
118. Id. 





124. Id. at 2062.
125. Id. 
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286 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 82
The Court did, however, emphasize the importance of one of the
Hosanna-Tabor considerations—an employee’s duties.126 The Court
asserted that, rather than taking into account the factors from Hosanna-
Tabor, the true takeaway of the decision should have been that any private
religious school teacher’s job is essential to the continuance of any and all
faiths, and therefore, the exception should apply to those who teach in
religious schools.127 The Court claimed that central to the holding in
Hosanna-Tabor was the fact that educators in religious schools serve to
inculcate faith-filled values into their students and further the mission of
the church.128 In summary, the Court determined that although the factors
used to decide Hosanna-Tabor were relevant to that specific case, those
factors may not be relevant or significant in other cases regarding the
ministerial exception.129 The majority concluded that the Ninth Circuit
erred by interpreting the ministerial exception much too narrowly when
rigidly applying the Hosanna-Tabor factors to Morrissey-Berru’s and
Biel’s cases.130 
2. Concurrence: Complete Deferential Approach
In his concurrence, Justice Thomas proposed that the First 
Amendment’s Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses demand that
secular courts give complete deference to a religious employer’s good
faith claims that a certain employee is ministerial.131 In support, he argued 
that the secular courts do not possess the requisite knowledge and
understanding of the traditions, doctrine, and dogma of each faith.132 
Therefore, he continued, the initial step in determining whether or not an
employee qualifies as a minister is an ecclesiastical question in itself and
not an issue for the secular courts to decide.133 
To further his argument, Justice Thomas noted that the organization
and structure of various faiths differ greatly.134 In addition to hierarchical
differences, he asserted that religious beliefs, functions, and roles also
126. Id. at 2064.
127. Id. 
128. Id. 
129. Id. at 2063.
130. Id. at 2068.
131. Id. at 2069–70. (Thomas, J., concurring) (citing Hosanna-Tabor 
Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. E.E.O.C., 565 U.S. 171, 196 (2012)
(Thomas, J., concurring)).
132. Id. at 2070.
133. Id. 
134. Id.
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2872021] COMMENT
differ among faiths, and these differences would create difficulty for a
secular court to objectively decide who is a minister in a particular faith.135 
Ultimately, Justice Thomas argued that the determination of ministerial
status is an ecclesiastical question because it is a question that involves
religious doctrine.136 He added that the First Amendment “commands civil
courts to decide [legal] disputes without resolving underlying
controversies over religious doctrine.”137 In summary, Justice Thomas 
emphasized that intrusion by the courts into the issue of who constitutes a
minister would create an entanglement between church and state, which is
precisely what the First Amendment aims to prevent.138 
3. Dissent: Exponential Potential for Abuse
Writing in dissent, Justice Sotomayor argued that employment
discrimination protections should be generally applicable, while
exceptions, such as the ministerial exception, should be narrowly
applicable in scope.139 She asserted that the United States’ “pluralistic
society requires religious entities to abide by generally applicable laws.”140 
In support of her argument, Justice Sotomayor demonstrated that secular
impositions on religious institutions do exist and include paying Social
Security taxes, abiding by child-labor laws, and abiding by minimum-
wage laws.141 She added that Congress implemented protective measures
into legislation to preserve the autonomy of religion within the nation.142 
For reference, she provided the example of the Americans with Disabilities
Act, which contains an exemption that allows a religious organization to
give preference to a candidate for employment whose faith aligns with that
of the organization.143 
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Id. (citing Presbyterian Church in U.S. v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull
Mem’l Presbyterian Church, 393 U.S. 440, 449 (1969)).
138. Id.
139. Id. at 2071 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
140. Id. at 2072.
141. Id.; see United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 256–61 (1982); Prince v.
Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166–70 (1944); Tony & Susan Alamo Found. v.
Sec’y of Labor, 471 U.S. 290, 303–06 (1985); see also Bob Jones Univ. v. United
States, 461 U.S. 574, 603–05 (1983). Entities that discriminate based on race are
denied nonprofit status. Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693, 699–701 (1986).
142. Our Lady of Guadalupe Sch., 140 S. Ct. at 2072.
143. Id.
360570-LSU_82-1_Text.indd  292 11/19/21  12:02 PM




   
   




   
 
    
  
   
    
    
  
   
  
   
   
   
 
     
    
   




   
      
  
      
  
      
   
   
       
    
    
     
    
  
    
  
288 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 82
Additionally, Justice Sotomayor argued that the way in which the
Court interpreted the ministerial exception in Our Lady of Guadalupe
School increases the exception’s potency, fortifying a legacy of condoning
animus in employment relations between a religious organization and its
employees.144 The exception grants an employer the ability to
“discriminate because of race, sex, pregnancy, age, disability, or other
traits protected by law when selecting or firing their ‘ministers,’ even
when the discrimination is wholly unrelated to the employer’s religious
beliefs or practices.”145 Justice Sotomayor argued that because of the
exception’s potency and the potential for absurd results, the Court should
have followed the traditional totality-of-the-circumstances approach that
the Court endorsed in Hosanna-Tabor and that many federal courts used
to determine who is a minister.146 Looking to the exception’s foundation, 
Justice Sotomayor noted that although courts have recognized that the
ministerial exception serves to protect a religious organization’s ability to
select its own leaders without government intrusion, common employment
law regulations still cover most employees.147 Justice Sotomayor
expressed that, after the majority’s broad interpretation, the exception
penetrates the protective shield over lower-level employees hired by
religious organizations and institutions.148 
Justice Sotomayor reasoned that interwoven into case law from the
Third, Fourth, Fifth, and Ninth circuits regarding the ministerial exception
is a common thread: an understanding that if a teacher at a private school,
even if teaching the faith, identifies as a member of the laity,149 he would
not be considered a minister.150 She also revisited the decisions of the 
lower-level courts in which they looked to the quality of leadership the
144. Id.
145. Id. (citing Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. 
E.E.O.C., 565 U.S. 171, 194–95 (2012)).
146. Id.; see also Scharon v. St. Luke’s Episcopal Presbyterian Hosps., 929
F.2d 360, 363 n.3 (8th Cir. 1991).
147. Our Lady of Guadalupe Sch., 140 S. Ct. at 2072; see also Rayburn v. Gen.
Conf. of Seventh-Day Adventists, 772 F.2d 1164, 1168–69 (4th Cir. 1985);
Hankins v. Lyght, 441 F.3d 96, 117–18 n.13 (2d Cir. 2006).
148. Our Lady of Guadalupe Sch., 140 S. Ct. at 2073.
149. “Laity” means “the people of a religious faith as distinguished from its
clergy.” Laity, MERRIAM-WEBSTER (2020).
150. Our Lady of Guadalupe Sch., 140 S. Ct. at 2073; see also Geary v.
Visitation of Blessed Virgin Mary Par. Sch., 7 F.3d 324 (3d Cir. 1993); Dole v.
Shenandoah Baptist Church, 899 F.2d 1389 (4th Cir. 1990); E.E.O.C. v. Miss. 
Coll., 626 F.2d 477, 479, 485 (5th Cir. 1980); E.E.O.C. v. Fremont Christian Sch.,
781 F.2d 1362, 1369–70 (9th Cir. 1986).
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2892021] COMMENT
employee possessed to determine whether someone was a minister for the
purposes of the ministerial exception.151 
Additionally, Justice Sotomayor endorsed Hosanna-Tabor’s “context
specific” analysis for determining ministerial status.152 In Hosanna-Tabor, 
the Supreme Court articulated that the ministerial “exception applies to
someone with a leadership role ‘distinct from that of most of
[organizations’] members,’ someone in whom ‘[t]he members of a
religious group put their faith,’ or someone who ‘personif[ies] the
organization’s ‘beliefs’ and ‘guide[s] it on its way.’”153 Justice Sotomayor
critiqued the Our Lady of Guadalupe School majority’s broad
interpretation of who constitutes a minister, comparing it to a
“mechanical . . . trigger” and a “rubber stamp” for discrimination based on
animus to persist and perhaps expand in the employment field.154 In
summary, Justice Sotomayor endorsed the Ninth Circuit’s approach to
defining ministerial status through the Hosanna-Tabor factors, asserting
that the majority’s failure to use this totality-of-the-circumstances test
defied reason. 155 
Lastly, Justice Sotomayor warned that the expansion of the scope of
the ministerial exception will inevitably lead to severe consequences.156 
She also insinuated that the majority’s decision was influenced, in part, by
the public opinion that the Court partakes in religious discrimination.157 
She alleged that in an attempt to rectify this public opinion, the majority
chose to take an extreme and sweeping stance, “permitting religious
entities to discriminate widely and with impunity for reasons wholly
divorced from religious beliefs.”158 She concluded that the ministerial
exception, as it stands in its expanded interpretation, allows religious
employers the power to discriminate against whomever they consider their
ministers based not only on religious beliefs but also based on animus, far
too powerful of an ability for any institution.159 
151. See Geary, 7 F.3d 324; Dole, 899 F.2d 1389 (4th Cir. 1990); Miss. Coll., 
626 F.2d at 479, 485; Fremont Christian Sch., 781 F.2d at 1369–70.
152. Our Lady of Guadalupe Sch., 140 S. Ct. at 2076.
153. Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. E.E.O.C., 565
U.S. 171, 188, 191, 196 (2012).
154. Our Lady of Guadalupe Sch., 140 S. Ct. at 2076.
155. Id. at 2082.
156. Id.
157. Id.; see generally Espinoza v. Mont. Dept. of Revenue, 140 S. Ct. 2246,
2257 (2020).
158. Our Lady of Guadalupe Sch., 140 S. Ct. at 2082.
159. See id.
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B. Effects of the Expansion
In 1972, the Fifth Circuit created the ministerial exception as a means
of safeguarding the ability of churches to elect their own leaders without
governmental interference, thereby maintaining church autonomy.160 
Forty years later, in 2012, the Supreme Court affirmatively recognized the
ministerial exception and addressed the issue of who is considered a
minister under the exception, but the Court failed to formulate an official
set of factors to determine an employee’s ministerial status.161 The 2020
Supreme Court decision in Our Lady of Guadalupe School fully departed
from the narrow confines of the Fifth Circuit’s original creation of the
ministerial exception, which was designated for church leaders. The Court
broadened the exception’s applicability, relying entirely on a religious
employee’s function and ruling that all religious school teachers are
ministers for the purposes of the ministerial exception.162 Under this
sweeping holding, even lay teachers at religious institutions, schools, and
organizations are barred from bringing employment discrimination suits 
to court due to the ministerial exception.163 
From the moment the Court decided Our Lady of Guadalupe School, 
more than 100,000 secular teachers at private schools effectively lost their
right to bring an employment discrimination suit to court.164 Now,
religious employers may freely discriminate for any reason against these
teachers, who have no right to suit and no remedy for their employers’
mistreatment.165 Additionally, the far-reaching effects of this decision
carry the possibility of impacting more secular employees of religious
organizations who perform any sort of religious function, even if teaching
or preaching the faith is not their primary role.166 To name a few, this 
decision could affect “coaches, camp counselors, nurses, social-service 
workers, in-house lawyers, media-relations personnel,” and many more
hired by religious employers.167 Not only was the Court’s decision in Our
160. McClure v. Salvation Army, 460 F.2d 553, 560–61 (5th Cir. 1972).
161. See Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. E.E.O.C.,
565 U.S. 171 (2012).
162. See Our Lady of Guadalupe Sch., 140 S. Ct. 2049, 2064 (majority
opinion). Over time, the exception has been continually broadened by courts. See 
supra discussion Parts I–II. 
163. See id.
164. Liptak, supra note 10.
165. Id. 
166. Id. 
167. Our Lady of Guadalupe Sch., 140 S. Ct. at 2082 (Sotomayor, J.,
dissenting).
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2912021] COMMENT
Lady of Guadalupe School far-reaching, but the decision could be viewed
as one of judicial overreach. 
The Constitution vests specific power in the legislative and judicial
branches in order to create a system of checks and balances.168 Congress’s 
designated role is to promulgate law,169 and Congress previously passed
Title VII, which provides both protections for workers as well as
protections and exceptions for religious organizations and institutions to
discriminate in certain employment circumstances.170 Additionally, 
Congress passed other employment discrimination legislation in the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act, the Civil Rights Act of 1991, and the
Americans with Disabilities Act to further protect American employees
from discrimination.171 In Our Lady of Guadalupe School, the Supreme
Court essentially created legislation that circumvents Title VII and the
employment discrimination statutes.172 
Historically, when the Supreme Court made rulings within the
employment discrimination realm, Congress acted to essentially overturn
the Court’s rulings through legislation.173 However, because Our Lady of
Guadalupe School presents, fundamentally, a constitutional issue, 
Congress is constrained by the Court’s interpretation, and potential
remedies are limited due to separation of powers.174 
III. CONGRESS VERSUS COURTS
The Constitution vests the power of interpretation of the law in the
judicial branch.175 In creating and maintaining the validity of the 
ministerial exception, the Supreme Court relied on the separation-of-
168. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § I; see also U.S. CONST. art. III, § I.
169. Our Government: The Legislative Branch, THE WHITE HOUSE, https://
www.whitehouse.gov/about-the-white-house/the-legislative-branch/ [https://perma
.cc/V9JX-UBDU] (last visited May 29, 2021).
170. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-1.
171. 29 U.S.C. § 621; 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 12101.
172. See Our Lady of Guadalupe Sch., 140 S. Ct. at 2072 (Sotomayor, J.,
dissenting).
173. For example, Congress passed the Lily Ledbetter Fair Pay Act in direct
response to the Supreme Court’s decision in Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber 
Co., effectively overturning the Court’s ruling regarding timely notice in
compensation employment discrimination cases. See Lily Ledbetter Fair Pay Act 
of 2009, Pub. L. No 111-2, 123 Stat. 5; Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co.,
Inc., 550 U.S. 618 (2007).
174. See City of Boerne v. Flores, 117 S. Ct. 2157 (1997); see also infra
Section III.D for discussion of City of Boerne v. Flores.
175. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § I.
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292 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 82
church-and-state principles guaranteed in the First Amendment, 
particularly, the Establishment Clause.176 In relying so heavily on the 
Establishment Clause, the Court neglected to consider Congress’s role in
promulgating employment discrimination law as well as special
circumstances that circumvent the constraints of the First Amendment
regarding the separation of church and state.177 
A. Congress: Set the Standard with Title VII
Congress promulgated Title VII as part of the Civil Rights Act in
1964.178 The Civil Rights Act was Congress’s attempt to eradicate
discrimination within the United States, and as the name insinuates, the
Act passed in response to the Civil Rights Movement of the 1960s.179 Title 
VII set the standard for employment discrimination law within American
workplaces while also providing certain caveats that allow employers such
as religious organizations a limited right to discriminate.180 
1. Fight for Your Rights: The Civil Rights Act of 1964
The Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits employment discrimination 
based on “race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.”181 Congress drafted 
and passed this legislation during a very distinct era of American history.
The Civil Rights Movement of the 1960s arose out of the African
American community’s thirst for justice and equality after experiencing
centuries of oppression, discrimination, and continued segregation.182 
America saw an unprecedented amount of effective and targeted activism,
including protests, boycotts, and marches as people fought for recognition
of their most basic rights.183 
In response, Congress passed one of the most prolific pieces of civil
rights legislation in American history.184 Among its initiatives, the Civil
176. See Our Lady of Guadalupe Sch., 140 S. Ct. at 2060 (majority opinion).
177. See id. at 2072 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
178. 42 U.S.C § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2018).
179. See generally 1 EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW AND LITIGATION
§ 1:4 (2020).
180. See 42 U.S.C § 2000e-2(a)(1).
181. Id. 
182. Civil Rights Movement, ADL, https://www.adl.org/education/resources/
backgrounders/civil-rights-movement#about-the-movement [https://perma.cc/X9
F4-UMYG] (last visited January 27, 2021).
183. Id.
184. Id.
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2932021] COMMENT
Rights Act of 1964 integrated schools and public facilities, prohibited
discrimination in public places, and prohibited employment discrimination
under Title VII.185 From its inception, the Act’s purpose was to serve the 
compelling interest of providing equal opportunity and equal treatment of
both individuals and groups that faced repeated oppression.186 At the time
the Civil Rights Act of 1964 was drafted, Congress expressed the goal to
eliminate discrimination as its “highest priority.”187 The Civil Rights Act’s 
creation and implementation served as an attempt to remedy a “legacy of
mistreatment” of minority groups in America and resulted largely from
social activism.188 
2. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
Title VII protects workers from employment discrimination based on
“race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.”189 Congress included
exceptions within Title VII for religious employers to discriminate in
certain circumstances.190 Originally, the House version of the Act included
a proposed § 703, which is strikingly similar to the scope and function of
the modern-day ministerial exception.191 That version would have granted 
religious employers the unchecked power to discriminate for any reason
against their employees.192 Congress purposefully did not pass § 703 in its
broad proposed form, but rather Congress confined it to an exception for
religious employers to discriminate based on religion only.193 This
exception is known as the creed exception, which allows religious
185. Id.
186. See generally 1 EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW AND LITIGATION
§ 1:4 (2020).
187. E.E.O.C. v. Pac. Press Publ’g Ass’n, 676 F.2d 1272, 1280 (9th Cir. 1982)
(quoting S. REP. NO. 88-872, pt. 1, at 11, 24 (1964)).
188. See generally 1 EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW AND LITIGATION
§ 1:4 (2020).
189. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1).
190. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-1 to 2000e-2.
191. Pac. Press Publ’g Ass’n, 676 F.2d at 1276 (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 88-
914, at 10 (1963), reprinted in EEOC, Legislative History of Title VII and XI of
Civil Rights Act of 1964 at 2010 (1968) (“1964 Legis. Hist.”) 1964 U.S.C.C.A.N.
2355).
192. Id.
193. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-1(a) (“This subchapter shall not apply . . . to a religious
corporation, association, educational institution, or society with respect to the
employment of individuals of a particular religion to perform work connected
with the carrying on by such corporation, association, educational institution, or
society of its activities.”).
360570-LSU_82-1_Text.indd  298 11/19/21  12:02 PM





   
    
 
  





   
  
    
 
   
    
  
   
   
  
  
   




   
 
   
      
      
    
  
    
   
      
       
  
294 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 82
employers to discriminate based on religion in order to employ individuals
who are of the employer’s faith.194 
Additionally, Title VII carves out a curriculum exception for religious
educational institutions to hire candidates who are members of the faith of
the organization.195 Title VII also contains a bona-fide-occupational-
qualification exception.196 In claiming this exception, an employer may
discriminate if it can show a reasonable necessity for the discriminatory
employment preference.197 The bona-fide-occupational-qualification
exception may be invoked by any employer, including a religious
employer.198 The creed exception, curriculum exception, and bona fide 
occupational qualification exception serve as narrow but effective
exceptions that religious organizations may invoke in order to discriminate
for the purposes of ensuring that they fulfill their religious missions.
Traditionally, Title VII would have protected those who are now
affected by the ministerial exception under Our Lady of Guadalupe
School.199 In defense of an employee’s employment discrimination claims,
the religious employer could have utilized any of the three exceptions that
Title VII carved out to “justify” its discrimination. In those situations,
however, a court would rule on the validity of this justification and thus
provide a check on the discriminatory power of the employer.200 Instead,
in broadening the definition of “minister,” the Supreme Court expanded
the scope and unchecked discriminatory power of the omnipotent
ministerial exception.201 
B. Court: Disregarded the Standard and Depended on the First
Amendment
When the circuit courts and Supreme Court faced ministerial
exception cases, they failed to give credence to the standards that Congress
194. Id.
195. See id. § 2000e-2(e)(2).
196. See id. § 2000e-1(e)(1).
197. Bona Fide Occupational Qualification (BFOQ), WESTLAW GLOSSARY,
https://content.next.westlaw.com/Glossary/PracticalLaw/I0f9fe64eef0811e2857 
8f7ccc38dcbee?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&firstPage=tr 
ue [https://perma.cc/TV6U-HSPF] (last visited January 27, 2021).
198. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-1(e)(1).
199. Id. § 2000e-2(a)(1).
200. See id. §§ 2000e-1(a), 2000e-2(e)(2), 2000e-1(e)(1).
201. See Our Lady of Guadalupe Sch. v. Morrissey-Berru, 140 S. Ct. 2049,
2080 (2020) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
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2952021] COMMENT
set regarding employment discrimination law in Title VII.202 Rather, 
courts used the First Amendment’s Free Exercise and Establishment
Clauses to justify broadening the demographic affected by religious
institutions’ unchecked discriminatory power in the ministerial
exception.203 Particularly, in ministerial exception cases, courts quite often 
allude to the “impregnable” wall separating church and state in
America.204 
1. The Wall: Constitutionally Compelled
The Constitution vests in the judicial branch the power to interpret the
law.205 In Our Lady of Guadalupe School, the Supreme Court relied on the
First Amendment in its reasoning for expanding the definition of
“minister.”206 The First Amendment reads, “Congress shall make no law 
respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise
thereof . . . .”207 The two clauses in the First Amendment are commonly
referred to as the Establishment Clause and Free Exercise Clause.208 The 
Establishment Clause precludes “excessive government entanglement
with religion,” and the Free Exercise Clause “protects not only the 
individual’s ‘right to believe and profess whatever religious doctrine one
desires’ . . . but also a religious institution’s right to decide matters of faith,
doctrine, and church governance.”209 Both clauses are relevant to the
reasoning behind the ministerial exception, but the Court particularly
focused on the implications surrounding the Establishment Clause.210 
The Establishment Clause’s purpose is to prohibit the government
from establishing a religion; its historical basis is prohibition of a state-
sponsored church.211 The Supreme Court devised a three-factor analysis in
Lemon v. Kurtzman to determine what constitutes an establishment of
202. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e)(2).
203. See Our Lady of Guadalupe Sch., 140 S. Ct. at 2060–61.
204. See McClure v. Salvation Army, 460 F.2d 553, 558 (5th Cir. 1972).
205. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § I.
206. See Our Lady of Guadalupe Sch., 140 S. Ct. at 2060, 2069.
207. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
208. See generally id.
209. Petruska v. Gannon Univ., 462 F.3d 294, 306, 311 (3d Cir. 2006); U.S.
CONST. amend. I.
210. See Our Lady of Guadalupe Sch., 140 S. Ct. at 2060.
211. First Amendment and Religion, U.S. COURTS, https://www.uscourts.gov/
educational-resources/educational-activities/first-amendment-and-religion [https:
//perma.cc/UFQ9-G3HK] (last visited February 24, 2021).
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296 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 82
religion within the confines of the Establishment Clause.212 The three
factors outlined in Lemon are (1) if the primary purpose of the assistance
is secular in nature, (2) if the effect is not one to advance or endorse
religion, and (3) if there is no excessive entanglement between church and
state.213 The ministerial exception raises concern in regard to Lemon’s 
excessive-entanglement factor, as the secular government’s interference in
the relationship between a religious employer and employee could be
construed as entangling matters of church and state.214 Courts analogize
the degree of separation needed between the two entities and warranted by
the First Amendment to an “impregnable” wall.215 Though the 
Constitution guarantees the separation of church and state in America, the
Court failed to duly acknowledge that the metaphorical wall that separates
the two competing interests is, in fact, not impenetrable.216 
2. Illusion of Impregnability 
Courts compared the separation needed to safeguard against the threat
of entanglement between church and state to a “high and impregnable”
wall.217 However, years of jurisprudence show that though this wall stands
in principle, it is far from impenetrable.218 Secular courts have repeatedly
enforced mandatory regulations on religious institutions and
organizations, such as the requirements to pay Social Security taxes,
follow minimum-wage laws, and abide by child-labor laws.219 Therefore,
212. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971). This factor analysis is
colloquially referred to as the Lemon test. Id. Though it remains precedent,
Lemon’s applicability has recently been severely questioned by the Supreme
Court, creating some ambiguity in the law. See Am. Legion v. Am. Humanist 
Ass’n, 139 S. Ct. 2067 (2019) (in which the Court expressed disdain for the
“shortcomings” of, but did not explicitly overrule, the Lemon test; in written
reasons, six justices between two opinions called for Lemon’s demise).
213. Id. at 612–13.
214. See Our Lady of Guadalupe Sch., 140 S. Ct. at 2069 (majority opinion).
215. McClure v. Salvation Army, 460 F.2d 553, 558 (5th Cir. 1972).
216. See Our Lady of Guadalupe Sch., 140 S. Ct. at 2080 (Sotomayor, J.,
dissenting).
217. McClure, 460 F.2d at 558.
218. See United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 256–61 (1982); Prince v.
Massachusestts, 321 U.S. 158, 166–70 (1944); Tony & Susan Alamo Found. v.
Sec’y of Labor, 471 U.S. 290, 303–06 (1985); see also Bob Jones Univ. v. United
States, 461 U.S. 574, 603–05 (1983). Entities that discriminate based on race are
denied nonprofit status. Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693, 699–701 (1986).
219. See Lee, 455 U.S. at 256–61; Prince, 321 U.S. at 166–70; Tony & Susan 
Alamo Found., 471 U.S. at 303–06.
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2972021] COMMENT
though the interest of continuing and guarding the principle of separation
of church and state is well-grounded, courts can and have intruded when
there is a compelling governmental interest at stake and the issue reaches
a level of paramount interest.220 Congress expressed, with great import, the
government’s interest in eradicating discrimination and bias through its
promulgation of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.221 Arguably, America’s
current social climate features a resurgence of many aspects of the Civil
Rights Movement of the 1950s and 1960s.222 This resurgence of activism
in America indicates that there is a compelling interest in modern society
for more protections against discrimination rather than less.223 
C. America’s Current Social Climate
The year 2020 ushered in a new wave of social justice activism lead 
by citizens around the nation and particularly on social-media platforms.224 
Arguably, this era of activism parallels the social climate that served as the
backdrop of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.225 Recently, Politico interviewed
Clayborne Carson, a professor of American history at Stanford University
and the director of the Martin Luther King Jr. Research and Education
Institute, who participated in the Civil Rights Movement protests in the
1960s.226 Carson observed that today’s protests are larger in size compared
to those that occurred in the 1960s.227 He attributed this increase to the
involvement of America’s younger generations joining together to actively
220. See Our Lady of Guadalupe Sch., 140 S. Ct. 2049; McClure, 460 F.2d at
558 (citing Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963)).
221. E.E.O.C. v. Pac. Press Publ’g Ass’n, 676 F.2d 1272, 1280 (9th Cir. 1982)
(citing S. REP. NO. 88-872, pt. 1, at 11, 24 (1964)). Congress, through enacting
Title VII, considered prohibiting discrimination as a “highest priority.” Id.
222. See Kalhan Rosenblatt, A summer of digital protest: How 2020 became
the summer of activism both online and offline, NBC (Sept. 26, 2020), https://
www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/summer-digital-protest-how-2020-became-su
mmer-activism-both-online-n1241001 [https://perma.cc/9YRN-EXR7]; see also
Valerie Strauss, This is my generation’s civil rights movement, THE WASHINGTON
POST (June 6, 2020), https://washingtonpost.com/education/2020/06/06/this-is-
my-generations-civil-rights-movement/ [https://perma.cc/J58H-6N9K].
223. See Rosenblatt, supra note 222; see also Strauss, supra note 222.
224. See Rosenblatt, supra note 222.
225. See Ruairi Arrieta-Kenna, Why a Civil Rights Veteran Thinks the Protests
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298 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 82
stop discrimination and social injustice in our society.228 He emphasized
that if the nation implements or fails to rectify unjust social policies and
laws, “people are right to reject [those policies]. That’s not a
democracy.”229 The perpetuation of discrimination and the broadening of
the power held by religious employers to discriminate constitutes an unjust
social policy. The resounding voice of Americans who fight for social 
justice and equality echoes that sentiment as they urge for more protections
for those against whom discrimination persists in American society.230 
Lastly, Carson asserted that though protests may directly arise from police
brutality or a specific incident, there is a larger goal to be realized that
supersedes these underlying issues—the true destination of the movement
will provide a more sweeping change in American policy and society and
is still yet to be realized.231 
Carson’s words emphasized that the Civil Rights Movement, though
timelined in history books as occurring in the 1950s and 1960s, continues
into present day society.232 In this revived era of social and political
activism, Americans urge for more protections against discrimination.233 
Certainly, the goal of protecting citizens from discrimination constitutes a
compelling interest, as Congress itself articulated that eliminating
discrimination was its “highest priority” when drafting and promulgating
the Civil Rights Act of 1964.234 This priority remains prevalent as 
evidenced by the subsequent federal employment discrimination laws
Congress enacted, such as the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of
1967 and Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990.235 Since today’s social
justice activism is more widespread than it was in the mid-1900s,236 the 
government’s interest in eradicating discrimination is arguably more
prevalent and compelling than it was when Congress passed the Civil
Rights Act of 1964. 
The decision in Our Lady of Guadalupe School contravenes the
momentum and ideology that many Americans hold, as demonstrated by







234. E.E.O.C. v. Pac. Press Publ’g Ass’n, 676 F.2d 1272, 1280 (9th Cir. 1982)
(citing S. REP. NO. 88-872, pt. 1, at 11, 24 (1964)).
235. 29 U.S.C. § 621; 42 U.S.C. § 12101.
236. See Arrieta-Kenna, supra note 225.
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2992021] COMMENT
interest argument.237 The Court’s expansion of the definition of “minister”
for the purposes of the ministerial exception diminished the rights of
American citizens who teach in private schools and other employees who
perform any religious function.238 Our Lady of Guadalupe School serves 
as just one piece of the puzzle in a greater power struggle between
religious and individual freedom.
In the summer of 2020, the Supreme Court decided two more cases 
that feature the battle between religious and individual freedom. In June 
of 2020, the Court announced its landmark decision in Bostock v. Clayton
County.239 The Court consolidated three cases that centered on the issue of
whether Title VII protects gay and transgender people from discrimination
in the workplace.240 In a 6–3 decision, the Court found that gay and
transgender people are protected under Title VII’s ban on sex
discrimination.241 The majority noted that the holding may cause
employers to worry about violating their religious beliefs and that these
“worries about how Title VII may intersect with religious liberties are 
nothing new.”242 To combat this fear, the majority cited Congress’s
statutory exception for religious organizations under § 2000e-1(a), the
Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, and the ministerial exception
as doctrines that religious employers can utilize to preserve their religious
liberty.243 However, the majority conceded that issues about the interplay
between religious liberty and Title VII will continually need to be
addressed in future cases.244 Regardless of that imminent future issue, the
Court held that Title VII’s ban on employment discrimination based on
sex also provides protection from termination based on an employee being
gay or transgender.245 
In July of 2020, the Supreme Court decided Little Sisters of the Poor
Saints Peter and Paul Home v. Pennsylvania.246 The case’s central issue
237. See generally Our Lady of Guadalupe Sch. v. Morrissey-Berru, 140 S.
Ct. 2049 (2020) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting); see Arrieta-Kenna, supra note 225; 
see also Strauss, supra note 222.
238. See Our Lady of Guadalupe Sch., 140 S. Ct. at 2082 (Sotomayor, J.,
dissenting).
239. See Bostock v. Clayton Cnty., 140 S. Ct. 1731 (2020).
240. See id.
241. See id.




246. See Little Sisters of the Poor Saints Peter & Paul Home v. Pennsylvania,
140 S. Ct. 2367 (2020). This was a 7–2 decision. Id.
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300 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 82
was whether government departments rightly granted an exemption from
the contraceptive mandate247 in the Patient Protection and Affordable Care
Act of 2010 to employers with religious objections.248 The Court decided
that the plain language of the statute, which neither provided an explicit
list of services nor specifications on departmental creation of exceptions,
allows for governmental departments to create both standards of care and
moral exemptions.249 Conversely, the dissent argued that a broadening of
the exemptions is both unauthorized and inconsistent with Congress’s
intent to grant employees equal access to healthcare, including access to
contraceptives.250 Regardless, the Court ruled that the agencies could
promulgate regulations that permit private employers with religious
objections to deny women contraceptive coverage under the Affordable 
Care Act.251 
The Supreme Court’s review of these cases, including Our Lady of
Guadalupe School, demonstrates the Court’s continued interest in and
priority of determining the boundaries of separation of church and state.252 
While struggles with boundaries between individual freedom and religious
separation occur within the courtroom, outside of the courtroom an
American resurgence in grassroots social and political activism has gained
traction in 2020.253 America’s goal to eradicate discrimination should 
remain unchanged.254 The present era overwhelmingly demonstrates a 
surge of political and social activism that is larger in number and scope
than the Civil Rights Movement.255 Eradicating discrimination when it
undoubtedly occurs constitutes a compelling interest that warrants
intrusion into the religious sphere.256 
Congress provided teachers and other employees of religious
institutions the right to be free from employment discrimination when it
passed Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and other federal
247. After Congress passed the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of
2010, the government required certain employers to provide contraceptive
coverage for their employees. Id.
248. Id.
249. Id. at 2386.
250. Id. at 2041 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
251. Id. at 2386 (majority opinion).
252. See Our Lady of Guadalupe Sch. v. Morrissey-Berru, 140 S. Ct. 2049
(2020); Bostock v. Clayton Cnty., 140 S. Ct 1731 (2020); Little Sisters of the 
Poor, 140 S. Ct. 2367.
253. See Arrieta-Kenna, supra note 225.
254. See id.
255. See id.
256. See id. at 2082.
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3012021] COMMENT
employment discrimination laws.257 The Supreme Court committed
judicial overreach in Our Lady of Guadalupe School by usurping the rights
that Title VII provided to these employees. Additionally, Title VII already
provided caveats for religious employers to discriminate in certain
circumstances before the Court’s overbroad expansion of the ministerial
exception.258 
D. The Bottom Line: Who Can Act? 
Though the intent of Congress in promulgating Title VII is rather
clear, the primary issue in Our Lady of Guadalupe School revolves around
the First Amendment as interpreted by the Court, which does not factor in
Congress’s intentions or statutory interpretations of Title VII.259 City of 
Boerne v. Flores rather famously illustrates what powers the Supreme
Court permits Congress to exercise when a constitutional issue arises.260 
The Court in City of Boerne considered whether Congress’s Religious
Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) was a proper exercise of its Fourteenth
Amendment authority.261 Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment
provides, “The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate
legislation, the provisions of this article.”262 The Court espoused that
Congress merely had a remedial rather than substantive power under the 
Fourteenth Amendment.263 In its reasoning, the Court alluded to Marbury
v. Madison when it stated, “When the Court has interpreted the
Constitution, it has acted within the province of the Judicial Branch, which
embraces the duty to say what the law is.”264 In sum, even though Section
5 of the Fourteenth Amendment explicitly gives Congress the authority to 
“enforce” the Fourteenth Amendment, the Supreme Court ruled that only
the Court can “interpret” the Constitution.265 Further, Congress’s
enforcement power is limited to enforcing only the Court’s interpretations,
not its own.266 
257. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-1, 1981, 12101; 29 U.S.C. § 621.
258. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-1.
259. See generally Our Lady of Guadalupe Sch. v. Morrissey-Berru, 140 S.
Ct. 2049 (2020).
260. See City of Boerne v. Flores, 117 S. Ct. 2157 (1997).
261. Id. at 2162.
262. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5.
263. City of Boerne, 117 S. Ct. at 2167.
264. Id. at 2172; Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
265. See City of Boerne, 117 S. Ct. at 2172.
266. See id.
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302 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 82
Critics of City of Boerne found fault with the Court’s decision for
inaccurate interpretations of the historical record and criticized the Court
for interpreting Congress’s authority so narrowly while expanding its own
power.267 Regardless of criticism, the Court further restricted Congress’s 
Fourteenth Amendment power in City of Boerne’s progeny, such as Board
of Trustees of the University of Alabama v. Garrett.268 Scholars coined the
ideological trend and vision seemingly embodied in the Court’s decisions
the “juricentric Constitution.”269 This ideology “imagines the judiciary as
the exclusive guardian of the Constitution.”270 Under the juricentric 
Constitution ideology, the executive and legislative branches are
empowered only to enforce the Supreme Court’s constitutional
interpretations.271 
Though Our Lady of Guadalupe School hinges on the First
Amendment, not the Fourteenth, it can be argued a fortiori272 that the
Court is once again expanding and reaffirming its own power as the
“exclusive guardian of the Constitution.” Nonetheless, with the current
composition of the Court making a successful challenge to City of Boerne
and its progeny unlikely, the Supreme Court is the only body able to act
with regard to the ministerial exception due to its First Amendment
implications.273 
Therefore, the Supreme Court should act to restore protections against
discrimination to teachers and other employees. The power of religious
employers or any entity to freely discriminate is an omnipotent power that
the Court should bestow sparingly. The Court should rectify its overbroad
interpretation of the ministerial exception by granting certiorari to another
ministerial exception case. In doing so, the Court should narrowly tailor
the definition of “minister.” To accomplish this goal, the Court should
revisit and revise the factors the Court devised in Hosanna-Tabor.
267. See Rachel Toker, Tying the Hands of Congress—City of Boerne v.
Flores, 117 S. Ct. 2157 (1997), 33 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 273 (1998); see also
Michael W. McConnell, Institutions and Interpretation: A Critique of City of
Boerne v. Flores, 111 HARV. L. REV. 153 (1997).
268. Robert C. Post & Reva B. Siegel, Protecting the Constitution from the 




272. “A fortiori” means “[b]y even greater force of logic; even more so it
follows.” A Fortiori, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019).
273. See supra discussion Sections I.A–B & II.A, in which the origins and
evolution of the ministerial exception are discussed.
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3032021] COMMENT
IV. HOSANNA-TABOR FACTORS: REVISITED AND REVISED
As Justice Sotomayor remarked in her dissent in Our Lady of
Guadalupe School, the Hosanna-Tabor factors merited consideration in
the Court’s determination of who is considered a minister.274 The majority
declined to consider all of the Hosanna-Tabor factors due to First
Amendment concerns, particularly the threat of excessive entanglement.275 
However, as the Court has stated and shown, the wall separating church
and state and safeguarding against entanglement between the two entities 
may be pierced if a compelling interest to do so is demonstrated.276 
Ultimately, the Court missed the mark in both Hosanna-Tabor and
Our Lady of Guadalupe School by overvaluing and undervaluing certain
relevant factors. As previously discussed, in Our Lady of Guadalupe
School, the majority solely focused on the employee’s religious functions
within the religious organization, thereby undervaluing other relevant
factors.277 This function factor was just one of the four relevant factors the
Court originally espoused in Hosanna-Tabor.278 In Hosanna-Tabor, 
however, the Court overvalued the employee’s formal title and the 
employee’s own belief of her role, which are both subjective in nature.
Accordingly, the Court should revisit and revise the original Hosanna-
Tabor factors. The Court in Hosanna-Tabor articulated four factors to
determine whether the plaintiff was a minister: (1) her formal title, (2) the
substance of that title, (3) her subjective belief of her role and her use of
title, and (4) her religious functions within the religious organization.279 
The revised test would include an objective leadership analysis, religious
function analysis, and subjective belief of the employee’s faith. This
revision would allow courts to conduct case-by-case inquiries to ensure
the sensibility and justice of the determination of which employees of
religious organizations are ministers for the purpose of the ministerial
exception. This case-by-case factual inquiry would somewhat differ from
the original Hosanna-Tabor factors, as it includes a leadership nexus as
well as a consideration of the employee’s own subjective beliefs regarding 
his or her faith and belief systems.
274. See Our Lady of Guadalupe Sch. v. Morrissey-Berru, 140 S. Ct. 2049,
2076 (2020) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
275. See id. at 2069 (majority opinion).
276. See supra discussion Section III.B.2. 
277. See supra discussion Section II.A.1. 
278. Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. E.E.O.C., 565
U.S. 171, 192 (2012).
279. Id. at 192.
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304 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 82
A. Trinity of Factors
First, the Court should implement a variation on the formal-title factor
from Hosanna-Tabor to determine who is considered a minister for the
purposes of the ministerial exception. This factor, in its original form, is
flawed because titles vary across faiths due to differing hierarchical
structures.280 For example, imams, pastors, and rabbis all fulfill rather lofty
leadership positions within their respective faith communities, but each
faith designates a different title to those in its sanctified leadership
positions.281 To resolve this possible issue, the factor should be revised to
involve an objective analysis. This objective analysis would help avoid
extraneous, unnecessary prying into doctrine. This can be done by looking
at the organization’s chain of command rather than doctrinal practices and 
belief systems. For example, the Court should examine the number of
superiors to whom the employee reports. The fewer superiors above the
employee, the more likely the formal-title factor is applicable and the more
likely the employee qualifies as a minister. Conversely, the fewer
subordinates below the employee, the more likely she is not a leader within
the faith. Ultimately, the courts would have discretion to make a good faith 
determination of this factor, and the factor should include an objective
analysis of the individual employee’s level of leadership. 
Second, the Court should still consider the employee’s functions. The
Court should derive this factor directly from the list of Hosanna-Tabor
factors. Similar to the majority’s conclusion in Our Lady of Guadalupe
School, the employee’s duties should play a significant role in the
determination of ministerial status and should accordingly be kept as a
factor in this revised list of considerations. However, it should not be the
sole determining factor.282 
Third, the Court should revisit the original factor from Hosanna-
Tabor of whether the employee held herself out to be a minister.283 This
factor in Hosanna-Tabor is limited as it concerns a subjective belief of
ministerial status. The Court should revise this factor to be more centrally 
focused on whether the person was a member of the faith of the
organization. As Justice Ginsburg posited during oral argument for Our 
Lady of Guadalupe School, it is a bit anomalous and nonsensical that
someone not of the faith could serve as a true minister of that faith, embody
280. See Our Lady of Guadalupe Sch. v. Morrissey-Berru, 140 S. Ct. 2049,
2063 (2020) (majority opinion).
281. See id. at 2064. 
282. See infra Section V.B for illustrations of this factor in action.
283. Hosanna-Tabor, 565 U.S. at 192.
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3052021] COMMENT
the values of that faith, and instill those values in his or her students when
her beliefs do not align as such.284 
Courts should weigh these factors utilizing a totality-of-the-
circumstances approach. This test ensures a narrower ministerial
exception than the current test as defined in Our Lady of Guadalupe
School.285 Though some factors might be deemed to encroach upon the 
religious sphere, the compelling interest of protecting American workers
from unchecked discrimination justifies such an intrusion.286 
B. Hypotheticals
The following hypotheticals demonstrate the proposed revised
Hosanna-Tabor factors in action. The hypotheticals take place in
Louisiana, a state in which 84% of adults identify as religious.287 
Louisiana’s private school enrollment numbers rank 5% higher than that
of the nation’s average.288 Therefore, because of the highly saturated 
Louisiana religious landscape, private schools in the state require a greater
number of faculty and staff.289 These statistics imply that the recent
decision in Our Lady of Guadalupe School impacts a large demographic
of Louisianans; therefore, Louisiana is a realistic backdrop for the
following hypotheticals. 
284. Transcript of Oral Argument at 9, Our Lady of Guadalupe Sch. v.
Morrissey-Berru, 140 S. Ct. 2049 (2020) (No. 19-267). Justice Ginsburg
questioned, “How can a Jewish teacher be required to model Catholic faith,
counter to his or her own beliefs - - how can a Jewish teacher be a Catholic
minister?” Id.
285. Our Lady of Guadalupe Sch., 140 S. Ct. at 2069.
286. See discussion supra Part III.
287. Adults in Louisiana: Religious composition of adults in Louisiana, PEW 
RSCH. CTR.: RELIGIOUS & PUB. LIFE, https://www.pewforum.org/religious-
landscape-study/state/louisiana/ [https://perma.cc/3WR8-ZC28] (last visited Mar.
23, 2021).
288. Louisiana K-12 Public Education: Governance, Demographics, and
Enrollment, TULANE UNIV.: COWEN INST. FOR PUB. EDUC. INITIATIVES, (Apr.
2009), http://www.thecoweninstitute.com.php56-17.dfw3-1.websitetestlink.com
/uploads/5-LouisianaK-12Education_002-1505880743.pdf [https://perma.cc/NQ
W9-E4KN]. Louisiana’s private school enrollment makes up 16% of total K-12 
enrollment, which is higher than the nationwide average of 11%. Id.
289. Id.
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1. Joseph
Joseph is hired by a Catholic school in Lafayette, Louisiana, to fill the
position of religion curriculum coordinator. In this new position, Joseph
develops, implements, and oversees annual religious training for
employees as well as regulates how Catholicism is taught to the school’s
students in grades K-12. Additionally, Joseph chooses a “virtue of the
year” for the school and confers with the diocese directly regarding matters
of doctrine. Per the school’s requirement that the religion curriculum
coordinator be a confirmed member of the Catholic faith, Joseph disclosed
his Catholic faith on his employment application and in his interview with
administration. Is Joseph a minister who falls under and whose claim is
barred by the ministerial exception?
This hypothetical is rather simple in analysis. First, a religion
curriculum coordinator falls rather high on the leadership ladder of a 
school microcosm. People in this role are often directly overseen by a
diocese or church parish, and then they in turn instruct and implement how
the faith will be taught to the students in the school. Joseph would be
directly overseen by the diocese, placing him high in the chain of
command while also placing him in charge of a great number of people.
Therefore, the leadership nexus would likely be met. Next, a religion
curriculum coordinator’s entire role is one of fortifying and implementing
doctrinal teachings within the school. Lastly, Joseph is a member of the
Catholic faith. This prong is satisfied without any further inquiry into the
depth of his beliefs or whether or not he would be considered a practicing
Catholic. Therefore, the ministerial exception would bar any employment
discrimination suit in the event that the school fires Joseph.
Suppose Joseph was not a Catholic. Joseph holds a position of
leadership as the curriculum coordinator, oversees a number of other
employees, and is directly overseen by the diocese. In addition, his entire 
job function is related to the teaching of the faith. These two factors would
outweigh the fact that Joseph does not consider himself to be a minister of
the faith in the totality-of-the-circumstances analysis. Therefore, the courts
should still consider Joseph a minister for the purposes of the ministerial
exception.
2. Mary
Mary is a first-grade teacher at an Episcopal school in New Iberia,
Louisiana. She teaches secular courses as well as daily teachings in the 
Episcopal faith. She brings the students to Episcopalian services and leads
the students in prayer. Mary is not Episcopalian; rather, she is a non-
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denominational Christian. In her role as a teacher, she holds a leadership
position only in regard to her students and her teaching assistant.
Otherwise, she is a subordinate to her principal, curriculum coordinator,
and priest. Would Mary fall under the category of minister for the purposes
of the ministerial exception?
First, Mary does serve as a leader in some respects, but she is near the
bottom of the chain of command within her school microcosm. Therefore,
the leadership nexus would likely not be met. Next, Mary does fulfill
religious duties in the form of teaching the faith and bringing the children
to service. However, she also fulfills secular duties. Next, she is a non-
denominational Christian and does not identify as Episcopalian. This
would fail the third prong. Given this set of facts and analyzing them using
the refined Hosanna-Tabor factors, Mary would likely not constitute a
minister for the purposes of this exception.
Now, suppose Mary is an eighth-grade Episcopalian religion teacher
within the school instead. Mary’s role as an eighth-grade religion teacher
is solely to teach the Episcopalian faith to her students. She develops
lesson plans under the guidance and subject to the approval of the religious
curriculum coordinator. Suppose all the other facts about Mary remain
unchanged. This set of facts proposes a more challenging analysis. From
an objective standpoint, the leadership nexus prong is likely to remain the
same as if Mary were a first-grade teacher. Secondly, Mary’s sole function
is to teach the Episcopalian faith to her students and inculcate its values.
Thirdly, Mary is not of the Episcopalian faith; therefore, the internal faith
prong is not satisfied. Because Mary’s only duty is religious, she would
likely fall under the ministerial exception because her entire purpose
revolves around teaching the faith.
3. Martha
Martha is a pre-K teacher’s assistant at a Baptist school in Baton
Rouge, Louisiana. Martha identifies as a Baptist believer. The school
follows all curriculum requirements from the state, but it also incorporates
its own religion course requirements. Martha’s job includes assisting the
primary teacher, helping to implement classroom procedures, and
escorting the students to and from elective courses. She also sometimes
teaches the religion portion of the day as well as helps to teach other
general skills to students. Would Martha fall under the ministerial
exception?
First, since Martha is an assistant, she falls in rank below a teacher and
far below administration. The first prong of the revised Hosanna-Tabor
factor analysis, the leadership nexus, would not be met. Next, Martha
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identifies as a Baptist and is an employee of a Baptist school. Therefore,
the internal-faith factor would be met. Lastly, Martha primarily assists the
teacher in performing and implementing classroom procedures, and
though she might occasionally teach the religion portion of the class, her
secular duties far outweigh the religious. Therefore, the function prong 
would likely not be met. Overall, Martha would likely not be considered a
minister for the purposes of the ministerial exception. 
CONCLUSION
In Our Lady of Guadalupe School v. Morrissey-Berru, the Supreme
Court expanded the definition of “minister” for the purposes of the
ministerial exception.290 Under its current interpretation, the ministerial 
exception bars teachers and any employees who carry out a religious
function at a private, religious school from bringing an employment
discrimination suit against their employer.291 The result strips hundreds of
thousands of lay private-school teachers of their right to not be
discriminated against by their employer.292 In particular, the result of
Kristin Biel’s case seems unconscionable but serves as an accurate
portrayal of exactly how much discriminatory power the Supreme Court
vested in religious employers.
Through the Supreme Court’s unquestionable broadening of the scope
of “minister,” the Court divested American workers of the protections that
Congress bestowed on them in Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.293 
Congress specifically developed Title VII and other federal employment
discrimination laws to include protections for employees against
discrimination as well as protections and exceptions for religious
employers to discriminate based on religion or any reasonably necessary
job qualification.294 The Court contravened these narrow but potent
exceptions through its expansion of the ministerial exception,  committing
judicial overreach.
Though the Court relied on the First Amendment for its reasoning,
compelling interests allow intrusion of the not so “high and impregnable”
wall separating church and state.295 Congress, at the time it promulgated 
the Civil Rights Act of 1964, espoused that eliminating discrimination was
290. See Our Lady of Guadalupe Sch., 140 S. Ct. at 2072 (Sotomayor, J.,
dissenting).
291. See id.
292. Liptak, supra note 10.
293. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-1.
294. See id. §§ 2000e-1(a), 2000e-2(e)(2).
295. McClure v. Salvation Army, 460 F.2d 553, 558 (5th Cir. 1972).
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its greatest priority.296 This priority arose from one of the great social and 
political activism eras of America.297 Today, America experiences a 
resurgence of activism as Americans gather to fight for social justice and 
equality against persisting and pernicious discrimination.298 Therefore, a 
compelling interest exists, warranting respectful intrusion into most of the
employment decisions of religious employers in the interest of preventing
and eradicating discrimination. Thus, the ministerial exception should be
interpreted narrowly.
Because the Supreme Court has the exclusive right to interpret the
Constitution, only the Court has the power to rectify its error.299 The
Supreme Court should grant certiorari on another ministerial exception
case and narrowly tailor the definition of “minister.” To determine who
constitutes a minister for the purposes of the exception, the Court should
revisit and revise the Hosanna-Tabor factors. The trinity of factors the
Court should espouse are an objective-leadership nexus, function factor,
and internal-faith factor. Secular courts would consider these factors and
have the discretion to determine ministerial status. This would limit the
scope of impact that the omnipotent ministerial exception carries and
create more reasonable results for potential litigants like Kristin Biel.
Under the revised factor analysis, Biel would not qualify as a minister
for the purposes of the ministerial exception. First, her position as an
elementary school teacher at a private school places her near the bottom
of the chain of command with many superiors and without inferiors.300 
This would fail the first prong of the totality-of-the-circumstances test.
Next, she served a religious function in that she taught her students religion
out of a textbook and brought them to mass.301 However, she also served
a secular function in that she taught secular subjects to her students as
well.302 Biel spent most hours of the day in the classroom teaching her
students secular subjects. This circumstance would likely fail the function
prong. Lastly, Biel was a Catholic, 303 so the internal-faith prong would be
satisfied. 
296. E.E.O.C. v. Pac. Press Publ’g Ass’n, 676 F.2d 1272, 1280 (9th Cir. 1982)
(citing S. REP. NO. 88-872, pt. 1, at 11, 24 (1964)).
297. See Arrieta-Kenna, supra note 225.
298. See Rosenblatt, supra note 222; see also Strauss, supra note 222.
299. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § I; City of Boerne v. Flores, 117 S. Ct. 2157,
2172 (1997) (for the proposition that when the Court is interpreting the
Constitution, it is acting within its proper authority).
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Considering all the factors together, Biel would not be considered a
minister for the purposes of the ministerial exception, and therefore, she
would be able to bring her claim of employment discrimination against St.
James School. As demonstrated, the refined factor test would provide
employees of religious organizations the Title VII protections Congress 
intended for them to have while still providing religious employers the 
right to invoke the omnipotent ministerial exception in cases where it is
warranted.
